# Redaction Log — AIW Security Audit Docs (Public Release)

**Generated:** 2026-05-19 (UTC)
**Process:** `redact.xml` (security-docs-publisher skill v1.0.0)
**Branch:** `security-docs-publish`

This log is published alongside the audit documents. It exists so anyone can
see **exactly** what was changed before public release and why — the redaction
was principled and minimal, not arbitrary. Originals in `docs/` were never
modified; only the copies in `docs/security/` were processed.

## Summary

Ten audit documents were processed. **Eight were copied verbatim** (they
contained no sensitive values). **Two received surgical redactions** totalling
**6 substitutions** across 3 categories:

- **R-01** (credential value): 1 substitution
- **R-07** (real mainnet wallet address): 2 substitutions
- **R-09** (process IDs): 3 substitutions

No findings, evidence, payloads, endpoint names, source line numbers, stagenet
transaction hashes, or stagenet addresses were altered or removed. Per the
governing rules, the default was **transparency** — when in doubt, content was
kept.

## Rule legend

| Rule | Action | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
| R-01 | REDACT | Real credential values (RPC passwords, session secrets, PINs) |
| R-02 | KEEP | Stagenet transaction hashes — core verifiable evidence |
| R-03 | REVIEW | Windows/Unix paths exposing a real username |
| R-04 | KEEP | HTTP status codes, response bodies, payloads, endpoint names |
| R-05 | KEEP | Source line numbers / function names cited as evidence |
| R-06 | REVIEW | Docker container names (keep) / internal bridge IPs (remove) |
| R-07 | REDACT | Mainnet wallet addresses of real funded wallets |
| R-08 | KEEP | The stagenet self-send test address (zero value) |
| R-09 | REDACT | Process IDs and non-default config that aids an attacker |

---

## Per-file detail

### SECURITY-REVIEW.md
- **Rules applied:** none (verbatim copy)
- **Changes made:** none
- **Changes kept & why:** HTTP codes, endpoint names, fix markers (`AUD-###`),
  and source references kept (R-04, R-05) — they are proof-of-work and the
  app's security does not depend on hiding them. No credential value, mainnet
  address, PID, username path, or bridge IP was present.

### SECURITY-AUDIT2.md
- **Rules applied:** none (verbatim copy)
- **Changes made:** none
- **Changes kept & why:** Env-variable *names* (e.g. `DASHBOARD_PASSWORD`,
  `DECREE_PIN`, `STRIKE_API_KEY`) appear only as names in prose describing the
  Agent-SDK env allowlist — these are not values and are kept (R-04/R-05).
  No secret values present.

### SECURITY-AUDIT3.md
- **Rules applied:** none (verbatim copy)
- **Changes made:** none
- **Changes kept & why:** Function/line references and the phrase "the wallet
  password" (prose, not a value) kept (R-05). No sensitive values present.

### SECURITY-AUDIT4.md
- **Rules applied:** none (verbatim copy)
- **Changes made:** none
- **Changes kept & why:** Endpoint names, fix markers, line numbers kept
  (R-04/R-05). No sensitive values present.

### SECURITY-AUDIT5.md
- **Rules applied:** none (verbatim copy)
- **Changes made:** none
- **Changes kept & why:** As above (R-04/R-05). No sensitive values present.

### SECURITY-AUDIT6.md
- **Rules applied:** none (verbatim copy)
- **Changes made:** none
- **Changes kept & why:** `STRIKE_PIN` appears only as an env-var name in prose
  (R-04). No values present.

### SECURITY-AUDIT7.md
- **Rules applied:** none (verbatim copy)
- **Changes made:** none
- **Changes kept & why:** `STRIKE_PIN` referenced as a variable name in the R1
  finding; `safeStrEqual` and other function names kept as transparency
  signals (R-05). No values present.

### SECURITY-AUDIT8.md
- **Rules applied:** none (verbatim copy)
- **Changes made:** none
- **Changes kept & why:** Env-var names and `server.mjs:NNNN` line citations
  kept (R-04/R-05). No values present.

### SECURITY-AUDIT9.md
- **Rules applied:** R-09, R-07
- **Changes made:**
  - **R-09** — `PID 32468` → `PID [PID]` (the installed-app process ID in the
    "System under test" header).
  - **R-07** — one real mainnet **Bitcoin** address
    (`bc1q…` — the operator's `BTC_WALLET_ADDRESS`) used as a *wrong-network
    test input* in case **T-009-02** → `[BTC_ADDR_REDACTED]`. The finding is
    unchanged: a BTC bech32 address was correctly rejected as an XMR
    destination — the proof value does not depend on the literal address.
- **Changes kept & why:** ALL stagenet tx hashes (R-02), every HTTP
  status/response body/attack payload P-01–P-20 (R-04), all `server.mjs:NNNN`
  and function-name citations (R-05), the stagenet wallet name
  `test-wallet-02` and balance, and generic docker container names
  `aiw-xmr-wallet-stagenet` / `aiw_default` (R-06 — already public via the
  shipped docker-compose). No internal bridge IP (172.x) was present.

### SECURITY-AUDIT9-RETEST.md ⭐
- **Rules applied:** R-01, R-09, R-07
- **Changes made:**
  - **R-01** — `--rpc-login aiw:-1Tcke…` → `--rpc-login aiw:[WALLET_RPC_PASS]`
    (one occurrence, T-003 section). The wallet-rpc digest password prefix is
    replaced with a descriptive placeholder; the sentence and the finding
    (—rpc-login *is* enforced, refuting the Gap-5 hypothesis) read identically.
  - **R-09** — `PID 37444` → `PID [PID]` (2 occurrences: the "System under
    test" header and the T-008-02 `Get-NetTCPConnection -OwningProcess`
    command).
  - **R-07** — one real mainnet **Bitcoin** address (`bc1q…`) used as the
    wrong-network test input in **T-009-02** → `[BTC_ADDR_REDACTED]`. Finding
    unchanged.
- **Changes kept & why:** The stagenet self-send anchor address
  `56C2ZE1pLbG2zxqaKMFcUpHksR6ktnskuCdEvgo2KxxuA8haWLrsfqYZSxQRK7ubyBeadYo6nSC3mUkiKJnc38YQCwV4Bf2`
  (R-08), **every** stagenet tx hash in the on-chain evidence appendix (R-02 —
  this is the verification anchor and must never be redacted), all HTTP
  codes/response bodies/curl commands (R-04), all `server.mjs` line numbers and
  helper names `getPendingPreview` / `setPendingPreview` / `clearPendingPreview`
  / `isRateLimited` / `getTrustedIP` (R-05), and generic container names plus
  the `aiw_default` network name (R-06). The `<WALLET_RPC_PASS>` placeholder
  that already existed in the doc (T-003-01 table) was left as-is — it was
  never a real value.

---

## What was deliberately NOT redacted (and why)

- **Stagenet transaction hashes** (R-02) and the **stagenet self-send address**
  (R-08): these are on Monero **stagenet** — coins with zero monetary value.
  They are the independently verifiable anchor of the entire audit. Redacting
  them would destroy the evidence. Anyone can confirm them on a stagenet block
  explorer.
- **Attack payloads P-01–P-20** (R-04): public-knowledge prompt-injection
  patterns. Publishing them demonstrates the app *resisted* them — it builds
  credibility, it does not aid an attacker.
- **Source line numbers and function names** (R-05): an open-source-style
  transparency signal. The security depends on the logic being correct (proven
  dynamically), not on hiding where it lives.
- **Docker container names** (R-06): already public in the shipped
  `docker-compose.yml`. No internal bridge IPs were present to remove.
- **Env-variable names** (`DECREE_PIN`, `WALLET_RPC_PASS`, `STRIKE_PIN`, …):
  these are configuration *key names*, not secrets — kept so the hardening
  narrative is readable.

Nothing was summarized, compressed, or deleted. Full document content is
preserved end to end.